Sanford Clark Gordon

Sanford Clark Gordon is an assistant professor of Politics at New York University. He received his B.A. from Cornell and his Ph.D. from Princeton. Broadly, his research concerns how political and economic elites respond to the incentives created by their institutional and informational environments. He has published articles on the electoral incentives of criminal prosecutors and trial court judges, the ability of corporate actors to employ political expenditures as signals to the bureaucracies that regulate them, and political methodology. He has also written on the function of challengers as auditors of incumbent behavior in competitive electoral systems, and the relationship between the political activities of corporate executives and the structure of their compensation.

Currently, Gordon is engaged in two major collaborative research projects. The first, with Catherine Hafer, concerns the incentives that Congress can create for regulatory agencies in the conduct of their enforcement responsibilities. These incentives may, in turn, motivate regulated firms to enter the political arena to obtain private benefits from those agencies rather than comprehensive legislation to benefit their entire industry. The second, with Gregory Huber, examines how state legislatures have placed constraints on the discretion of trial judges in light of the electoral incentives of both the legislators and judges.