@unpublished{40, keywords = {lobbying, polarization}, author = {Gleason Judd}, title = {Access to Proposers and Influence in Legislatures}, abstract = {

Access is an important prerequisite for outside influence. I study a model in which targeted access provides interest groups with chances to lobby policy proposals by certain politicians. I show how this prominent form of access can have subtle consequences in equilibrium: by changing the prospects for future lobbying, it can influence today{\textquoteright}s votes and, in turn, other proposals and lobbying expenditures. The magnitude of these effects varies with polarization and their direction depends on the interest group{\textquoteright}s extremism relative to its target. They can work in the group{\textquoteright}s favor or against it, potentially even overwhelming the direct benefit of more lobbying opportunities. For example, moderate groups crave access to relatively extreme politicians but avoid access to a range of more centrist politicians. The results build our theoretical understanding of access and have implications for various political expenditures.

}, year = {0}, url = {http://gleasonjudd.com/Research/leglobby-web.pdf}, note = {

Access is an important prerequisite for outside influence. I study a model in which targeted access provides interest groups with chances to lobby policy proposals by certain politicians. I show how this prominent form of access can have subtle consequences in equilibrium: by changing the prospects for future lobbying, it can influence today{\textquoteright}s votes and, in turn, other proposals and lobbying expenditures. The magnitude of these effects varies with polarization and their direction depends on the interest group{\textquoteright}s extremism relative to its target. They can work in the group{\textquoteright}s favor or against it, potentially even overwhelming the direct benefit of more lobbying opportunities. For example, moderate groups crave access to relatively extreme politicians but avoid access to a range of more centrist politicians. The results build our theoretical understanding of access and have implications for various political expenditures.

}, language = {eng}, }